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Abstract: Prior International Political Economy (IPE) public opinion research has
primarily examined how economic and socio-cultural factors shape individuals’ views on the
flows of goods, people, and capital. What has largely been ignored is whether individuals
also care about rewarding or punishing foreign countries for their policies on these
subjects. To test this possibility, we administered a series of conjoint and traditional
survey experiments in the United States and China that examined how reciprocity
influences opposition to foreign acquisitions of domestic companies. We find that
reciprocity is an important determinant of public opinion on the regulation of foreign
investments. This suggests the need to consider the policies that other countries adopt
when trying to explain public attitudes towards global economic integration.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 2016, populist movements swept across the globe. Most prominently, the
United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union and the United States elected
Donald Trump president. Although there are certainly many reasons for these results,
the success of these populist campaigns have been seen, at least in part, as a rejection of
global economic integration. One argument that was repeatedly used as a justification for
rejecting integration is that other countries are behaving unfairly, and, as a result, that
new restrictions are needed on the flows of people, goods, and capital.1 For example,
Donald Trump repeatedly argued on the campaign trail that retaliations against China are
needed because its trade and investment practices are unfair. In other words, Trump not
only tried to appeal to voters by arguing that new restrictions on trade and investments
from China may improve their economic prospects, but also that reciprocity requires
them.
Although a growing body of international political economy (IPE) scholarship
has studied why individuals form preferences towards trade, immigration, and
international investment, this literature has largely ignored whether the policies other
countries adopt influence individual attitudes. Instead, this literature has primarily
examined how economic and socio-cultural factors affect public opinion.2 For example,
one line of this scholarship has found that economic factors—like an individual’s skill
set, sector of employment, or asset holdings—are often highly correlated with views on
trade and immigration.3 Another line of this scholarship has found that socio-cultural
factors—like nationalism, out group resentment, and cosmopolitanism—are also highly
correlated with views on these topics.4 Little research, however, has examined the extent
to which the desire for reciprocity influences views on IPE.5
1

See, e.g., Beinhocker 2016.
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Hellwig 2014, 2–3.
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Citrin et al. 1997; Lü, Scheve, and Slaughter 2012; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Margalit 2012.
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In this paper, we provide evidence that reciprocity is an important determinant of
public opinion in one area of international political economy: the regulation of foreign
direct investment (FDI). Reciprocity, in this area, is the idea that policy makers can
encourage other countries to open their markets to investments by permitting or
restricting FDI. This concept is well understood by government officials. For example,
former Secretary of Commerce Elliot Richardson has explained that the reason it is
important for the United States to welcome FDI is that ‘[i]t is patently impossible to
open doors for American business abroad while we slam shut the doors to foreign
business in our own country.’ 6 Not only are government officials aware of the
importance of reciprocity, it has driven the adoption of US policies on FDI: the United
States’ process for regulating foreign investment emerged from concerns about the influx
of FDI from Japan at a time when it maintained policies that denied reciprocal market
access.7
But despite the ample evidence that reciprocity has been a major driver of FDI
policy in the United States and other countries, it has not received much theoretical
attention from IPE scholarship. Over the last two decades, a growing body of IPE
research has sought to understand why counties regulate FDI. 8 Given that a major
finding of that literature is that regulations on inward FDI are based on domestic
political considerations, it is not surprising that a related line of scholarship has emerged
studying the determinants of public support for inward FDI flows.9 These studies have
focused, however, on using public opinion data and surveys to evaluate how skills and
economic position influence individual support for inward foreign investment.
To our knowledge, scholars have not yet evaluated whether reciprocity influences
public support for restrictions on FDI flows. But there are good reasons to believe that it
6

Richardson 1989, 282.
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Kang 1997; Milhaupt 2008; Prestowitz 1988.
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For a review of this scholarship, see Pandya 2016, 459–60.
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would. For one, foundational research in international relations has long theorized that
reciprocity can play an important role in international affairs as a way of inducing cooperative behavior.10 This logic may lead individuals to think reciprocity is important to
ensuring that foreign governments provide access to their markets. Alternatively, recent
research has shown that reciprocity can be an important driver of individual foreign
policy preference.11 This research has built, in part, on findings from psychology and
behavioral economics suggesting that individuals care deeply about fairness, and thus are
likely to respond positively to others that behave co-operatively and to punish others that
behave unfairly. This suggests that an important driver of individual support for foreign
investments may be whether the potential investments are from countries that allow
reciprocal investments. In other words, people might not just care about how the
investment could affect their economic or physical security, but also whether they think
that allowing it is fair.
In order to evaluate the effect of reciprocity on public opinion toward inward
FDI, we fielded a series of survey experiments in the United States and China. We
fielded two experiments to both a nationally representative sample of 2,010 adults in the
United States and a stratified sample of 1,659 adults in China, and we fielded a third
follow-up experiment to a sample of 838 respondents recruited through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk service. Our primary experiment used a conjoint design that allowed us
to directly compare the relative influence of reciprocity and a number of factors
previously theorized as driving opposition to foreign investments. This experiment asked
respondents whether the government should block a series of hypothetical acquisitions
of domestic firms by foreign companies. Our second and third experiments focused on
positive and negative reciprocity by asking respondents how they thought their
government should respond to one of several changes that a foreign country could make
to its inward investment policies.

10

E.g. Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984.
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Brewer et al. 2004; Kertzer et al. 2014; Kertzer and Rathbun 2015.
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The results of these experiments suggest that reciprocity is an important
determinant of public opinion on the regulation of foreign investments. In both the
United States and China, respondents were consistently more likely to oppose foreign
acquisitions when the foreign firm’s home country did not provide reciprocal market
access. More specifically, in our conjoint experiment, American respondents were 16
percentage points—and Chinese respondents were 19 percentage points—more likely to
oppose a potential acquisition when the foreign firm’s home country prohibited market
access. We also found suggestive evidence that respondents may be more supportive of
punishing negative reciprocity than they were of rewarding positive reciprocity.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. Reciprocity & the Regulation of FDI
China has recently made the importance of reciprocity to FDI policy a salient
issue. Despite being one of the largest sources of outward FDI,12 China heavily restricts
inward FDI. In fact, data compiled by the OECD suggests that China has more
restrictions on inward FDI than any other OECD or BRIC country. 13 This lack of
reciprocity in FDI policy has emerged as a major source of friction between China and
other countries. A 2016 Brookings Institution report even argued that the ‘lack of
reciprocity between China’s investment openness and the US system is the most
worrisome of the trends’ in investment between the two countries.14
This concern over a lack of reciprocity is not new—China simply provides the
most recent example of this phenomenon. Concerns over reciprocity have long been
identified as a major driver of investment policy in the United States and other

12

Sauvant and Nolan 2015.
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This data is available at <http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm> (last visited

May 25, 2016).
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Dollar 2016, 18.
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countries. 15 For example, the restrictions that the United States places on foreign
investments were developed in the 1980s in response to apprehensions over the rise of
investment from Japan when it was not open to reciprocal investments from America.16
As one scholar wrote, ‘the largest underlying cause of friction over Japanese FDI in the
1980s was the perception that, while the US was wide open to Japanese investment and
imports, US firms faced substantial barriers to investment and trade in Japan.’17
There have even been proposals to base US investment policies explicitly on the
principle of reciprocity. For example, Prestowitz argued that the US should restructure

regulations on foreign investments to give foreign firms only the access and protections
that their home countries provided to American firms.18 A bill enshrining this proposal
has even been repeatedly introduced in the United States Congress, 19 and US policy
toward some industries has explicitly incorporated reciprocity requirements.20

15

Although we focus on the United States, reciprocity is also an important driver of

investment policies in other countries. For example, during the takeover of the British candy
company Rowntree by the Swiss company Nestlé in 1988, there was a debate in the House
of Commons on the significance of the lack of reciprocity that Switzerland provided to
investors from the UK <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1988/jun/08/
rowntree-plc#column_850> (last visited May 25, 2016).
16

Kang 1997; Prestowitz 1988.
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Milhaupt 2008, 7.
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Prestowitz 1988.
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See Investment Policy Must be based on Reciprocity, March 12, 1991 (Statement of Tom
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Graham and Krugman 1995, 123.
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2.2. IPE Scholarship on the Regulation of FDI
Despite the evidence that reciprocity influences the regulation of FDI, it has not
been a major topic of IPE research. Over the last two decades, a growing body of
scholarship has examined the regulations that countries place on FDI flows. 21 More
specifically, this literature has studied why countries either adopt policies to encourage
inward FDI flows—like providing tax holidays—or policies to restrict inward FDI
flows—like restricting foreign acquisitions of domestic firms.22
These papers have primarily examined the economic and non-economic factors
that influence whether countries encourage or restrict inward FDI. For example, Pandya
argued that democracies adopt fewer restrictions on inward FDI because the general
public favors these policies due to Inward FDI’s positive effect on wages. According to
Pandya, autocratic regimes, on the other hand, are less willing to liberalize because they
are more responsive to the preferences of local firms that want to prevent competitors
from entering their market.

21

23

In related research, Owen argued that labor unions

See Crystal 1998; Crystal 2003; Crystal 2009; Graham and Krugman 1995; Graham and

Marchick 2006; Jensen et al. 2014; Kang 1997; Li and Resnick 2003; Meunier 2014; Owen
2013; Owen 2015; Pandya 2010; Pandya 2014a; Pandya 2014b; Pinto and Pinto 2008; Pinto
2013.
22

It is worth noting that there is a great deal of IPE research on other topics, including: the

factors that make countries more likely to receive increased FDI flows (e.g. Büthe and
Milner 2008; Pandya 2010), the role that political institutions play in attracting FDI (e.g.
Jensen 2003; Jensen 2008; Li and Resnick 2003), and FDI’s effect on economic growth and
development (e.g. Aitken and Harrison 1999; Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson 1978;
Jackman 1982).
23

Pandya 2014a.
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opposed to inward FDI use their political power to block it in their industries. 24 To
support this argument, Owen presented evidence from nineteen developed countries
suggesting that high unionization rates are associated with greater restrictions on inward
FDI. Other studies have examined whether restrictions on inward FDI are based on
security considerations. Graham and Marchick reviewed controversial attempts by
foreign firms to acquire American companies and concluded that, although those
opposed to acquisitions often invoked national security concerns, their motivations were
primarily economic.25
These studies have primarily used observational data, but a few studies have
examined the determinants of individual attitudes towards FDI.26 For instance, Scheve
and Slaughter found that British workers in high FDI industries perceived themselves as
having less job security. 27 In another study, Pandya used public opinion data from
eighteen Latin American countries to show that individual preferences towards FDI are a
function of its distributional effects on income.28 Relatedly, Kaya and Walker analyzed
public opinion data from thirty-two countries and found that characteristics like higher
education and private sector employment are associated with respondents being less
likely to think that large multinational corporations hurt local business.29 Additionally,
two recent working papers have used survey experiments to explore attitudes towards
FDI. Jensen and Lindstädt conducted surveys in the United States and the United
Kingdom to examine public support for FDI. They found, among other things, that the
country that the foreign investment is from is a major determinant of opposition.30 Zhu
24

Owen 2013; Owen 2015.
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Graham and Marchick 2006.
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For a review of this literature, see Pandya 2016, 458.
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Scheve and Slaughter 2004.
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Pandya 2010.
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Kaya and Walker 2012.
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found that Chinese attitudes toward investment in high-skilled and low-skilled sectors
differ, and that individual characteristics are an important predictor of attitudes towards
both types of FDI.31
Although this body of literature has gone a long way to explaining why countries
may either encourage or restrict FDI, only a handful of papers have even considered
how reciprocity influences FDI policies. For example, Crystal argued that one reason
American firms have not lobbied hard for the US government to restrict FDI flows is
that these firms profit from other governments not restricting inward investments. 32
Additionally, Tingley et al. found that one factor that predicts which attempted
acquisitions of American companies by Chinese firms produce political opposition is
whether China restricts investments in the same industries.33
2.3. Why Reciprocity May Influence Public Opinion on FDI
Although reciprocity has not played a major role in scholarship on the regulation
of FDI, scholars have long understood that reciprocity plays an important role in
international relations generally. 34 Perhaps most notably, Robert Keohane argued that
reciprocity is fundamental for explaining state behavior because it can allow ‘cooperation
to emerge in a situation of anarchy.’35 The basic reason is that, even without hierarchical
power structures, states can influence the actions of other states by reciprocally
punishing or rewarding them.

31

Zhu 2015.

32

Crystal 1998.

33

Tingley et al. 2015.

34

See, e.g., Axelrod 1984; Dixon 1986; Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997; Keohane 1984;

Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; Richardson, Kegley, and Agnew 1981; van Wyk and
Radloff 1993; Ward 1981.
35

Keohane 1986, 27.
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Reciprocity has not only been used to explain international relations generally, but
also specific areas of IR. For instance, reciprocity is a critical part of international trade
policy.36 Indeed, scholars have argued that reciprocity has driven US trade policy since
WWII. 37 Further research has also shown that reciprocity plays an important role in
security policy.38 Goldstein and Freeman argued that the interactions between the United
States, the Soviet Union, and China during the Cold War can be best explained in terms
of strategic reciprocity. 39 In another example, Morrow found that reciprocity largely
explains compliance with the laws of war.40

Scholars have only recently begun to examine whether reciprocity might influence
individual attitudes about international relations. Some research is informed by motivated
by standard rational choice accounts of reciprocity’s role in conditional co-operation.41
Other research has built on findings from psychology and behavioral economics showing
that individual behavior may deviate from traditional rational choice models.42 One of
these deviations is that, even when they have to forgo individual gains to do so, concern
for equality and fairness may lead individuals to reward or punish others for ‘pro-self’
behavior. For example, individuals playing an ultimatum game in a lab may reject offers
they view as unfair even though it means leaving money on the table.43 Although this line
of scholarship has suggested that people may forgo individual gains to reward altruistic

36

Bagwell and Staiger 2002.

37

E.g. Gilligan 1997.

38

Goldstein et al. 2001; Moore and Lanoue 2003.

39

Goldstein and Freeman 1990.

40

Morrow 2014.

41

Tingley and Tomz 2014.

42

For a discussion of the relevant literature, see Kertzer and Rathbun 2015.
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Rabin 2002.
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behavior, ‘[t]here also seems to be an emerging consensus that the propensity to punish
harmful behavior is stronger than the propensity to reward friendly behavior.’44
Drawing on these insights, a handful of papers have tested whether concerns
about reciprocity influence foreign policy preferences. 45 Kertzer et al., for instance,
studied how moral sentiments influence views on foreign policy and found that beliefs
about fairness and reciprocity are a particularly important predictor of attitudes towards
international relations generally. Similarly, Kertzer and Rathbun found that fairness
concerns influence how participants in the lab behave in scenarios developed based on
bargaining situations central to IR theory.46 Additionally, both Tingley and Tomz, and
Bechtel and Scheve found that reciprocity could affect attitudes towards climate change
policy,47 and Chilton found evidence indicating that reciprocity influences public support
for complying with international legal obligations during interstate conflicts.48
To our knowledge, previous public opinion research on individual support for
investment flows has not directly tested whether the general public is concerned about
reciprocity. The recent research on the role of reciprocity on foreign policy preferences,
however, suggests that the policies other countries adopt should directly influence
whether individuals are supportive of allowing foreign investments. In other words, even
though at least some research has suggested that outward FDI hurts domestic wages and
employment levels, 49 concern for fairness should make individuals want to punish
countries that do not allow their own countries’ firms to enter their markets. This
research also suggests that the desire to punish foreign countries for denying market
44

Fehr and Gächter 2000.

45

Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Brewer et al. 2004; Chilton 2015; Kertzer et al. 2014; Kertzer

and Rathbun 2015; Tingley and Tomz 2014.
46

Kertzer and Rathbun 2015.

47

Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Tingley and Tomz 2014.

48

Chilton 2015.

49

Blomström, Fors, and Lipsey 1997.
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access should be stronger than the desire to reward foreign countries for opening their
markets.
3. EMPIRICAL APPROACH
3.1. Research Method
For a combination of substantive and methodological reasons, we chose to use
survey experiments to research the relationship between reciprocity and support for
restrictions on FDI. The first substantive reason is the strong relationship between
democratic regimes and FDI flows. Existing evidence indicates that democracies attract
more inward FDI50 and impose fewer restrictions on inward FDI.51 Since democracies
are responsive to the concerns of the electorate, understanding whether the public cares
about reciprocity is important for understanding how reciprocity influences FDI policy.
Second, the returns on investments made by foreign multinational corporations are
affected by how the public perceives a firm’s legitimacy.52 Understanding the sources of
opposition to foreign investments is thus important for understanding investment
patterns. Finally, despite the fact that a substantial body of research has examined public
opinion regarding various international flows—like the flow of goods,53 foreign aid, 54 and
people across borders 55 —there has been comparatively little research on public attitudes
toward FDI flows. 56 Using survey experiments allows us to bring FDI flows into the
discussion of public opinion on IPE more generally.

50

Jensen 2003; Jensen 2008.

51

Pandya 2014a.

52

Kaya and Walker 2012.

53

E.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006.

54

E.g. Milner and Tingley 2013.

55

E.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010.
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There are also two methodological reasons that survey experiments are an
appealing way to study the relationship between reciprocity and support for restrictions
on FDI. First, since reciprocity likely correlates strongly with other factors that drive
opposition to FDI, it is difficult to isolate the effect of reciprocity on opposition to FDI
using observational methods. For example, there has been opposition to the surge in
inward FDI from China in the United States57 and in Europe, 58 but that surge happened
at the same time that those economies experienced downturns. Using observational data,
it is thus difficult to tell how much of the opposition is due to resentment that China
heavily restricts inward FDI flows and how much is due to the perception that Chinese
firms are taking advantage of a weak economy.59 Using survey experiments, however, it is
possible to estimate the effect of reciprocity on opposition to inward FDI flows by
varying levels of reciprocal market access while holding other features of the transaction
constant. Second, there are ways to design survey experiments—like the conjoint design
we use—that make it possible to simultaneously test the effects of many treatments.
Although our primary interest is the effect of reciprocity, as we will discuss in Part 3.3,
there have been a number of other factors that have also been hypothesized as driving
opposition to FDI. 60 Our research design allows us to estimate the relative effect of
reciprocity compared to other features of foreign investments that may drive political
opposition.
There are, of course, limitations to using survey experiments to study the
influence of reciprocity on public opinion. For example, if a survey experiment asks
57

Tingley et al. 2015.

58

Meunier 2014.

59

For instance, Jensen and Lindstädt (2013) found that public support for inward FDI was

heavily influenced by what country a proposed investment came from (i.e. Americans were
less supportive of investment from China than other countries). Experimental designs make
it possible to further explore whether concerns about reciprocity partially explains this result.
60

See Jensen and Lindstädt 2013; Tingley et al. 2015.
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participants their reactions to foreign countries’ policies based on a reported static state
of affairs (e.g. ‘country X has recently opened/restricted market access’), it may not
accurately capture the temporal component of reciprocity. That is, in this case,
reciprocity is about individual attitudes evolving in response to changes in policy over
time, not reporting their current position after being informed of news. This may bias
survey experiments towards finding an effect by failing to capture the ways that the
evolution of policy over time may attenuate reactions. Also, survey experiments largely
have research designs that rely on stated preference. Respondents may respond strongly
in a survey, but not hold their view strongly enough to translate it into action.61
3.2. Case Selection
We focused on one type of foreign investment: Mergers and Acquisitions
(M&As).62 This is in part because we believe that focusing on a specific type of foreign
investment is likely to generate more concrete views than simply asking respondents
about attitudes toward foreign investments generally. Given our decision to focus on a
specific type of investment, we chose to focus on M&As because we believe that they are
more likely to generate political opposition. Moreover, prior observational research has
examined factors that influence political opposition to M&As,63 which thus provides us
with alternative hypotheses to test.
We fielded our survey in the United States and China for three reasons. First, the
United States and China are the world’s two largest recipients of inward FDI. 64 As a
result, these are the two countries where it is arguably most important to understand
61

It is worth noting that a body of scholarship has suggested that public opinion is an

important driver of globalization policy (Kono 2008; Scheve and Slaughter 2007).
62

There are two basic types of FDI: M&As and ‘Greenfield’ investments. M&A investments

acquire existing ventures, while Greenfield investments start new ones.
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Tingley et al. 2015.
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Feldman 2015.
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opposition to foreign investment. Second, the United States is a democratic country that
has relatively low barriers to foreign FDI, whereas China is an autocratic country that has
relatively high barriers to foreign FDI. Since prior research has consistently found
differences in openness to FDI between democratic and autocratic countries, 65
examining the United States and China allows us to test whether our findings are
consistent across both regime types. Third, since the United States and China have spent
years negotiating a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) that would increase the reciprocal
protections afforded to foreign investors, 66 research on public opinion in these two
countries has the potential to influence an important current policy debate.
3.3. Alternative Determinants of Support for FDI
Although our principle focus is on reciprocity, other factors may influence
opposition to foreign acquisitions of domestic firms. As a result, we also tested other
factors that have been shown to drive opposition to FDI.
First, we examined the effect of the country of origin of the foreign firm.
Previous research has found that public attitudes towards a range of international
economic activities change based on the foreign countries involved. For example, Jensen
and Lindstädt found that American respondents’ openness to foreign investments
depended on those investments’ country of origin. 67 Relatedly, both Strezhnev and
Umaña, Brenauer, and Spilker found that support for preferential trade agreements
changed based on whether the country was a democracy or autocracy.68 Finally, Li and
Vashchilko showed that bilateral FDI flows were affected by national security
concerns. 69 We thus tested whether opposition to foreign acquisitions of domestic
companies changes based on whether the foreign firm was from China, Japan, or Saudi
65

Pandya 2016.

66

Hao 2015.

67

Jensen and Lindstädt 2013.

68

Strezhnev 2013; Umaña, Brenauer, and Spilker 2015.

69

Li and Vashchilko 2010.
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Arabia;70 whether a country is democratic or not; or whether a country is a security or
economic threat.
Second, we examined the effect of the type of Ownership of the foreign firm.
Previous research has suggested that American politicians are more likely to oppose
foreign investments from state-owned enterprises.71 This is perhaps because acquisitions
by state-owned enterprises are more likely to be viewed as negatively affecting economic
or national security. 72 As a result, we tested whether opposition towards foreign
acquisitions of domestic companies changes based on whether the foreign firm was
‘privately owned’ or ‘government owned.’
Third, we examined the effect of the domestic firm being in an industry that is
sensitive for national security. The primary way that a foreign acquisition of an American
company can legally be blocked in the United States under a review process that
regulates foreign investments is if the transaction poses a risk to national security. 73
Moreover, previous research has shown that American politicians are more likely to
oppose specific transactions when the target firm is in an industry that is important to
national security.74 We therefore tested whether opposition towards foreign acquisitions
of domestic companies changes based on whether the foreign firm was in an industry
that posed a ‘low’ or ‘high’ risk to national security.
Fourth, we examined the effect of the Firm Size of the target firm. It would be
reasonable to believe that opposition to foreign acquisitions would be higher for large
70

These three countries were selected for two reasons. First, foreign acquisitions from these

countries have generated opposition in the United States (Tingley et al. 2015). Second,
attitudes toward these countries have previously been examined in research on foreign
investment (Jensen and Lindstädt 2013).
71

Tingley et al. 2015.

72

Krugman 1994.
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Zaring 2010.

74

Tingley et al. 2015.

15

target firms with national profiles. This could be the case, for example, if those firms are
seen as particularly important for the country’s economic security or national identity.
Relatedly, previous research has shown that American politicians are more likely to block
specific transactions when the target firm has a value of over $200 million. 75 We
therefore tested whether opposition towards foreign acquisitions of domestic companies
changes based on whether the target firm was a ‘small company based in your area’ or a
‘large Fortune 500 company.’
Finally, we examined the effect of the target firm’s industry being in Economic
Distress. It has been theorized that opposition to foreign acquisitions of domestic firms
is likely to be greater when the domestic firm has experienced an economic downturn
relative to the rest of the country. 76 Moreover, research has shown that American
officials have blocked transactions when the targeted firms are in industries experiencing
economic distress and high rates of unemployment. 77 We therefore tested whether
opposition towards foreign acquisitions of domestic companies changes based on
whether the target firm is in an industry that has ‘lower’ or ‘higher’ rates of
unemployment than the national average.
4. PRIMARY EXPERIMENT
4.1. Subject Recruitment
Our Primary Experiment was conducted using an online survey administered to
respondents recruited by Survey Sampling International (SSI). SSI conducts surveys for
corporate and academic research in over 100 countries. We first administered our
experiment to a sample of 2,010 adults from the United States. This sample was
nationally representative of the adult population of Americans based on gender, age,
ethnicity, and census region. We subsequently administered our experiment to a sample

75

Tingely et al. 2015.

76

Crystal 2003.

77

Kang 1997; Tingley et al. 2015.
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of 1,659 adults from China that was stratified to reflect the Chinese population’s gender,
age, and region. The surveys were administered two weeks apart in February 2015.78
4.2. Survey Design
Our Primary Experiment used a conjoint design. Conjoint analysis is a marketing
tool that has recently started to be used in political science.79 Conjoint analysis presents
respondents with a profile or vignette where multiple attributes are randomly and
independently varied. For example, respondents may be presented the biography of a
hypothetical political candidate where characteristics like the candidate’s age, gender,
profession, political positions, and party identification are randomly varied. The
respondents would then be asked to evaluate several profiles or vignettes, and each time
they would be presented with a different combination of attributes. This conjoint design
makes it possible to then estimate the relative effect of each characteristic on the
respondents’ answers.
Conjoint analysis offers several advantages. 80 First, conjoint analysis improves
causal inference because it is possible to identify the effect of factors on individual
preferences without making functional form assumptions. Second, conjoint analysis
allows researchers to test many different hypotheses in a single research design. Third,
conjoint analysis enhances realism by asking respondents to evaluate choices with
multiple pieces of information, unlike traditional designs, which attempt to isolate
preferences along a single dimension. Fourth, conjoint analysis asks respondents to
register a single behavioral outcome—like supporting or opposing a given policy—which
makes it possible to evaluate the relative explanatory power of multiple theories. Fifth,
conjoint designs give respondents multiple reasons to justify any policy decision. Sixth,
conjoint analysis is an excellent way to evaluate policy designs because it makes it
78
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possible to predict which components of various policies are likely to have the most
support. Seventh, recent research has suggested that the realistic properties of conjoint
analysis result in high degrees of external validity.81
Although conjoint analysis has been used to study a number of topics in IPE,82 to
our knowledge, our experiment is the first to use a conjoint design to study the flow of
capital. In our conjoint experiment, respondents were asked to evaluate transactions
where a foreign firm is proposing to buy a domestic company.83 We randomly varied
features of each transaction related to the previously outlined hypotheses. More
concretely, respondents in the United States were presented with the following vignette:
Company A is a company based in [Country Treatment] that is [Ownership
Treatment]. Company A is currently attempting to acquire an American
company in an industry that is considered to pose a [National Security
Treatment] risk to national security. The American company is a [Firm Size
Treatment]. The American company is in an industry that is experiencing
[Economic Distress Treatment] than the American economy overall. The
country that Company A is based in currently has [Reciprocity Treatment] in
the same industry.
The text for the six-bolded treatments was randomly and independently varied.
The options for each of the six treatments are presented in Table 1. In total, by randomly
varying all of the options in Table 1, respondents in the United States were asked to
evaluate 576 different possible transactions.
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After reading about the potential transaction, the respondents were asked
whether their government should prevent the proposed acquisition. The respondents
were only given two options to register their opinion: yes or no. By doing so, we used a
ratings-based conjoint design 84 as opposed to a choice-based conjoint design. 85 The
respondents were then asked to evaluate four more potential transactions, but each one
presented the respondents with a different random set of treatments.86
There are four features of the vignettes used in our conjoint experiment worth
discussing. First, although some conjoint designs vary the order in which the treatments
are presented, our design always presented the treatments in the same order. Using an
invariant order has the advantage of allowing the vignette to take the form of a realistic
paragraph and is consistent with several other recent papers that have used vignettes in
conjunction with a conjoint design. 87 Presenting treatments in a fixed order does,
however, introduce an additional assumption into our research design: that the order of
the attributes does not affect the results. It is thus possible that the ordering of the
treatments biases our results and limits our ability to comparatively evaluate the effects
of treatments.
Second, the question we asked after the vignette was framed negatively (that is,
should the government block the proposed transaction). We choose this formulation
because it represents the policy choice that officials, at least in the United States, face.
The US default is that foreign acquisitions of American companies are allowed,88 but the
CFIUS process allows the government to block transactions that pose a national security
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risk.89 The implication is that policy leaders are likely to be focused on when citizens
want a transaction blocked, not when they want it approved. A concern with this
decision is that the negative framing may prime respondents to be less supportive of
transactions. That said, we do not believe this causes a substantial problem for our
research for two reasons: we are interested in relative effects of treatments (not absolute
levels of support for foreign transactions) and we conducted two additional experiments
that use a neutral framing.
Third, although we varied six features of the transactions in the survey fielded in
the United States, we were only able to vary four features in the survey fielded in China.
We intentionally designed the surveys to be comparable, but shortly before our survey
launched in China we were denied legal approval to ask Chinese respondents questions
that highlighted rivalries with foreign countries or national security concerns. Given this
constraint, Chinese respondents were given an amended version of the vignette that did
not contain the Country Treatment or the National Security Treatment.
Fourth, there are several aspects of the wording of our vignette that may bias or
limit the generalizability of our results. For example, our Country Treatment included
types of countries—e.g., a ‘democratic country’—as well as three specific countries
where there has been specific hostility to foreign investments in the US: China, Japan,
and Saudi Arabia. We did not, however, include specific countries from which
respondents may respond favorably to foreign investment. Our results thus do not allow
us to say how respondents may have reacted to countries that may have been viewed
more favorably. To put it another way, the ‘context’ of our vignette likely moderates the
effect of reciprocity, and since we only asked about reciprocity in specific contexts and
not the universe of possible cases, drawing broad generalizations from our findings may
be inappropriate.
For our National Security Treatment, we varied whether the company is in an
industry that ‘poses’ a high or low risk to national security. This was because specific
89
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industries are subject to greater scrutiny during the CFIUS review process based on their
relevance to national security. A more natural way to word this treatment, however, may
have been how ‘relevant’ the industry is to national security. Phrasing the treatment in
terms of risk may have thus have created confusion that biased the results for this
treatment.
Finally, our Firm Size Treatment varied whether the company was either ‘a
small company based in your area’ or a ‘national Fortune 500 company.’ Although it
reduced the total number of treatments to combine the geographic reach and size of the
company, confounding these variables makes it impossible to disentangle their effects.
4.3. Results
Figure 1 presents the result for the respondents in the United States.90 The dots
are point estimates, and the lines are 95% confidence intervals, of the influence that each
attribute has on the probability that respondents would support the government blocking
a proposed foreign acquisition of an American company. 91 The option listed first for
each treatment are baseline categories that serve as the benchmark for our estimates, and
they thus do not have a point estimate or confidence interval. For example, the baseline
for the Country Treatment is a ‘foreign country.’ Figure 1 thus shows that when a firm is
from ‘a country [that] is a security threat to the United States,’ respondents are 11
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percentage points more likely to support the government blocking the acquisition than
when the firm is from a ‘foreign country.’
Figure 1 reveals that levels of reciprocal market access in a foreign firms’ home
country have a substantial impact on support for blocking an acquisition. Compared to a
baseline of no restrictions, opposition increases by 11 percentage points when the
foreign firms’ home country has ‘a number of restrictions’ on American firms acquiring
their companies and by 16 percentage points when the home country has ‘an absolute
prohibition’ on American firms acquiring their companies. Interestingly, although market
access restrictions substantially increased opposition, support only increased by 1
percentage point when the foreign firms’ home country had signed a treaty permitting
American companies to acquire their companies.
Figure 1 also confirms prior research suggesting that the characteristics of the
country of origin have a substantial effect on opposition to foreign investment.92 Our
results suggest that respondents are 11 percentage points more likely to oppose an
acquisition by firms from countries describe as security threats to the United States and
15 percentage points more likely to oppose an acquisition by a firm from a country that
is both a security and economic threat. Interestingly, firms that are from countries that
are just economic threats—and not security threats—only increased opposition over the
baseline by 4 percentage points. Additionally, support increases by 8 percentage points
when the foreign firm is from a democratic country and decreases by 4 percentage points
when the foreign firm is from a non-democratic country.
In addition to testing types of countries, we also asked about three specific
countries: China, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. As previously noted, we selected these
countries because proposed acquisitions of American companies by firms from these
countries have generated controversy in the United States, and these three countries have
all been the subject of previous survey research. Respondents in our sample were 6
percentage points more likely to oppose an acquisition by firms from China, 4
percentage points less likely to oppose an acquisition by firms from Japan, and 5
percentage points more likely to oppose an acquisition by firms from Saudi Arabia being
92
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blocked. Our results are consistent with previous research suggesting that Americans are
more opposed to investments from China and Saudi Arabia than generic ‘foreign
countries,’ but more receptive to investments from Japan.93
Figure 1 also suggests that the ownership of the foreign firm has minimal impact
on support for blocking potential acquisitions. Opposition only increases by 1 percentage
point when the foreign firm is government owned compared to privately owned firms.
Unlike the ownership of the foreign firm, the national security risk of the industry being
targeted had a large effect. More specifically, opposition increases by 17 percentage
points when the targeted companies are in industries where the national security risk was
high compared to industries where the national security risk was low.
In contrast to the large effect of the national security treatment, the two
treatments that are proxies for the economic impact of the transaction had relatively
small effects. Opposition only increased by 1 percentage points when the foreign firm
targeted a company that is a national Fortune 500 company compared to small, local
companies. Additionally, support increased by 2 percentage points when the foreign firm
targeted companies in industries with rates of unemployment above the national average
compared to companies in industries with rates of unemployment below the national
average.
Figure 2 presents the results from the respondents in China. For the reciprocity
treatment, the Chinese respondents reacted comparably to American respondents. For the
Chinese respondents, opposition increased by 8 percentage points when the foreign
firms’ home country has ‘a number of restrictions’ on Chinese firms acquiring their
companies and by 19 percentage points when the home country has ‘an absolute
prohibition’ on Chinese firms acquiring their companies. As with the American
respondents, opposition decreased by 5 percentage points when the foreign firms’ home
country had signed a treaty providing Chinese companies the ability to acquire their
companies. These results indicate that reciprocity is a major concern for both American
and Chinese respondents.
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The results for the Ownership treatment were also similar to the American
sample: whether the foreign firm was privately or government owned had little impact
on levels of support. In contrast, the size of the firm being targeted did impact the levels
of opposition. Opposition increased by 11 percentage points when the foreign firm
targeted a large national company compared to a small, local company. Finally, the
Chinese respondents’ support increased by 7 percentage points when the foreign firm
targeted a company in an industry with high rates of unemployment compared to
companies in industries with low unemployment.
5. ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS
5.1. Secondary Experiment: Effect of Changes in Foreign Governments’ Policies
Our Primary Experiment revealed that reciprocity had a strong effect on public
opposition to the acquisition of domestic firms. A complete lack of reciprocity increased
opposition by 16 percentage points for American respondents and by 19 percentage
points for Chinese respondents. However, the results also revealed that a positive
reciprocal investment policy—signing a treaty to eliminate barriers—only increased
support for acquisitions by 1 percentage point for American respondents and by 5
percentage points for Chinese respondents.
Because we were interested in the relationship between positive and negative
reciprocity, our survey also included a Secondary Experiment focused solely on this
relationship. We included this experiment because our conjoint analysis tested the effect
of reciprocity on respondents’ support for blocking a specific transaction involving a
single firm, but we also wanted to measure the effect of reciprocity on levels of support
for broader restrictions on foreign acquisitions. We also wanted to frame government
decisions in an active way; that is, saying that the foreign government had recently
increased (or decreased) restrictions on investment.
In the Secondary Experiment, respondents were told that their country is
considering changing its policies on the purchase of domestic companies by foreign
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firms.94 The respondents were then told that a foreign country has recently made one of
five changes in their policies towards acquisitions of their companies. Specifically, the
respondents were randomly told that the foreign government had made it either: (1)
‘much harder’, (2) ‘somewhat harder’, (3) ‘no change in its process’, (4) ‘somewhat easer’,
or (5) ‘much easier’ for US (Chinese) companies to buy companies in their country. The
respondents were then asked whether the United States (China) should make it harder or
easier for companies from that foreign country to acquire domestic companies.
The top panel of Figure 3 presents the results for American respondents and the
bottom panel presents the results for Chinese respondents. Each horizontal line
represents a different level of restriction that respondents were told the foreign country
had recently implemented. The x-axis places responses on a scale from whether
respondents thought it should be ‘much easier’ (set at 0) or ‘much harder’ (set at 1) for
foreign companies to buy domestic companies. The dots represent the mean responses
and the lines represent the 95% confidence intervals for each treatment.
Changes in reciprocal market access had a significant impact on how open
American respondents thought that the United States should be to foreign investment.
When a foreign country has made it much harder for American companies to acquire
their domestic firms, the mean response was 0.77. On the other end of the spectrum,
even when the foreign country has made it ‘somewhat easier’ or ‘much easier’ for
American firms to acquire their companies, American respondents still were more
supportive of restricting access than increasing it. Specifically, both treatments had mean
responses of 0.60. Further, the deviation from the baseline of no change (0.65) was
smaller in the case of positive changes versus negative changes, but the difference does
not reach conventional levels of statistical significant (p = 0.10).
Changes in reciprocal market access also had a significant impact on how open
Chinese respondent thought that China should be to foreign investment. The mean
response was 0.69 when the foreign country made it ‘much harder’ and 0.48 when the
foreign country made it ‘much easier.’ The deviation from the baseline of no change
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(0.56) was smaller in the case of positive changes versus negative changes, but the
difference also does not reach conventional levels of statistical significant (p = 0.19).
There are two things worth noting about these results. First, these results provide
some suggestive evidence that positive reciprocity may be less strong than negative
reciprocity, but the results for both American and Chinese respondents failed to reach
statistical significance at conventional levels. Second, for all five treatments, Chinese
respondents were less supportive of increasing investment restrictions than the American
respondents. This finding could be a result of differences in our samples, Chinese
respondents being more open to foreign investment than Americans generally, or
respondents’ views being influenced by the very different absolute levels of restrictions
currently in place in the United States and China.
5.2. Follow-up Experiment: Positive and Negative Reciprocity
The Secondary Experiment only informed respondents about recent changes in
another country’s level of openness to foreign investments—it did not tell them about
the other country’s absolute level of openness to foreign investments. It is thus possible
that the results are driven by beliefs about absolute levels of market access. For example,
if American respondents believed that US investment policies were already dramatically
more open than China’s, Americans may consequently not feel the need to make the
United States more open to foreign investment in response to China opening its markets.
In other words, beliefs about the absolute level of market access may influence
willingness to punish negative policy changes or reward positive policy changes.
Given this concern, we conducted a follow-up experiment designed to
manipulate changes in market access and absolute levels of market access. The
experiment was fielded in June 2015 to 838 respondents in the United States recruited
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk) service. We elected to field our experiment
through mTurk because it offers the practical advantage of being dramatically cheaper
than recruiting respondents through traditional firms, but research has suggested that
mTurk still produces reliable results. 95 It is because of these desirable properties that
95
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mTurk has been widely used by political scientists to recruit respondents generally.96 As
in our case, it has also been used to recruit respondents for follow-up experiments
conducted after using traditional firms for primary experiments.97 The trade-off is that
mTurk samples are less likely to be representative of the general population than those
recruited by traditional firms, which potentially limits the generalizability of results.98
In our Follow-Up Experiment, respondents were told that “[o]n a scale of 0 to
10, where 0 is no restrictions and 10 is an absolute ban on foreign ownership, in
the past, Country A has had a score of [Past Score Treatment] for the ability of US
companies to buy companies in Country A. Today this country is now a [Present Score
Treatment].” 99 For both the Past Score Treatment and Present Score Treatment,
respondents were randomly told that the levels were 0, 3, or 6. We thus had nine total
treatment conditions. We then told the respondents that the United States is currently a 3
on this scale and asked the respondents whether the United States should make it easier
or harder for companies from Country A to buy American companies.100
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Figure 4 presents the baseline results of this experiment. The horizontal axis runs
from 0 (make much harder) to 1 (make much easier) and the vertical axis has each of the
possible treatment conditions. Each condition first lists the Past Score and then the
Present Score. For example, ‘3-6’ means the respondents were told that the country
previously had a score of ‘3’ but now has a score of ‘6’ (in other words, the country had
increased restrictions on foreign investments).
There are several findings worth noting in Figure 4. First, when the other country
was at the same level as the United States in both the past and present (‘3-3’), the mean
response was that the United States should not change its current policy. To be exact, the
mean response for the ‘3-3’ treatment was 0.49. Second, the respondents were most
likely to favor making it much easier for foreign firms to buy US companies when the
other country had the most open score (‘0’) in the present treatment. The respondents
were most likely to favor making it much harder for foreign firms to buy US companies
when the other country had the least open score (‘6’) in the present treatment.
Although these results are informative, our goal with this experiment was to test
the relationship between positive and negative reciprocity while simultaneously
manipulating changes in market access and absolute levels of market access. Specifically,
this experiment was designed to test the difference between positive and negative
reciprocity by comparing responses for pairs of treatments that meet two criteria: (a) the
size of movement between the past and present treatment are the same size; and (b) they
are now equidistant from the United States position of ‘3.’ There are four pairs of
treatments that meet these criteria: (1) ‘0-0’ & ‘6-6’; (2) ‘6-0’ & ‘0-6’; (3) ‘3-0’ & ‘3-6’; and
(4) ‘6-3’ & ‘0-3.’ For example, when we compare ‘6-0’ to ‘0-6,’ both moved by ‘6’ and
both countries now have policies that are equidistant from ‘3.’ If negative and positive
reciprocity were equally strong, then these two treatments would produce an average
response that was the same distance from the baseline treatment of ‘3-3.’ If negative
reciprocity has a larger effect, however, then ‘0-6’ would have a treatment effect that is a
greater distance from the baseline of ‘3-3’ than ‘6-0.’
To formally test this, we calculated a set of differences utilizing the ‘3-3’
treatment as a baseline. More specifically, we estimated a regression model with all the
treatment conditions as independent variables, clustered the standard errors by
28

respondent, and then differenced the coefficients appropriately. This produces the
‘difference-in-absolute differences’ between the four matched pairs, whereby a negative
value indicates that negative reciprocity had a larger treatment effect and a positive value
indicates that positive reciprocity had a larger treatment effect.
Figure 5 presents these results. Each line represents one of the four matched
pairs. To read Figure 5, take the matched pair of ‘0-0’ & ‘6-6’ that is presented in the first
line. The baseline ‘3-3’ treatment had an average response of 0.49. The ‘0-0’ treatment—
which asked respondents to consider a country that was more open to foreign
investments than the United States—had an average response of 0.45. The absolute
value of the distance between the ‘0-0’ treatment and the baseline ‘3-3’ treatment was
thus 0.04.
In contrast, the ‘6-6’ treatment—which asked respondents to consider a country
that was less open to foreign investments than the US—had an average response of
0.58. The absolute value of the distance between the ‘6-6’ treatment and the baseline ‘33’ treatment was 0.09. When you subtract this value (0.09) from the value for its matched
pair (0.04), the result is -0.05. This is the result reported in the first line of Figure 5. In
other words, for this matched pair, there is a bigger effect for the negative reciprocity
treatment than the positive reciprocity treatment. This difference, however, falls just
short of statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
Figure 5 shows that for all four matched pairs, the effect of the negative
reciprocity treatment is larger than the matched positive reciprocity treatment. The effect
is statistically significant at the 0.05 level for two of the pairs and at the 0.1 level for three
of the pairs. The effect is not statistically significant for the fourth pair (‘6-3’ to ‘0-3’).
But it is worth noting that this is the only pair where the foreign country ends with the
same policy as the United States (‘3’), and perhaps unsurprisingly, the respondents simply
answered that the United States should not change its policy. Taken together, these
results provide evidence suggesting may more readily support punishing other countries
for bad behavior than rewarding them for good behavior.

29

6. CONCLUSION
Our results suggest that reciprocity has an influence on opposition to foreign
acquisitions of domestic companies. When a foreign firm’s home country restricts
investments from the respondents’ country, the respondents are more likely to oppose
potential transactions. This result is consistent with findings that fairness and reciprocity
are important drivers of attitudes about foreign affairs generally, 101 and findings that
reciprocity is an important driver of public opinion about specific areas of international
relations.102
We also found some suggestive evidence that the effect of positive reciprocity
may be less strong than that of negative reciprocity. In other words, the public may want
their government to block investments from countries that restrict FDI flows, but may
be less likely to support easing restrictions on firms from countries with few limitations
on foreign investments. This finding, although inconclusive, is consistent with findings
from experiments in psychology and economics about individual responses to negative
and positive reciprocity.103 It is also consistent with the fact that there have been calls in
the United States to restrict investments from countries that do not provide access to
American firms, but there have not been parallel proposals to provide additional market
access to countries that have fewer market restrictions than the United States.104
Before continuing, it is important to acknowledge that although our experiments
suggest that reciprocity has an influence on public opinion on FDI, they do not
demonstrate why reciprocity might affect opinion. It is possible that individuals care
about reciprocity because they believe that it will induce co-operative behavior from
other countries, or that individuals care about reciprocity because believe they fairness
norms are important. Relatedly, it may simply be the case that FDI is a ‘hard’ issue for
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the public to process,105 and reciprocity thus may be an appealing heuristic because it
provides an intuitive answer to a hard question. Future research will be required to
adjudicate between these possible explanations.
There are several caveats to our results that should be noted. First, the effect of
reciprocity on attitudes towards FDI may be particularly strong in the United States and
China. Both countries are major sources of outward FDI as well as leading destinations for
inward FDI. This may lead respondents in these countries to care more about reciprocal

market access than respondents would in countries with less outward FDI. Second, we
focused on M&As and not Greenfield investments. We choose M&As in part because
we believed they would produce stronger public reactions, so reciprocal access for other
forms of FDI may produce weaker responses. Third, our survey experiments asked
respondents for their opinions on individual transactions, and as a result they may not
have fully captured the temporal aspects of reciprocity. Future research is needed to
determine whether repeated FDI interactions attenuate the effect of reciprocity, or lead
to patterns of escalation or de-escalation. Fourth, although we found that reciprocity was
an important determinant of public opposition to proposed foreign investments, this
does not mean that these views would necessarily drive changes in actual policy. By
showing that reciprocity can change public opinion, our results provide evidence for one
step in a possible causal chain—they do not prove every link.106
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driver of globalization policy (Kono 2008; Scheve and Slaughter 2007). Of course, public
opinion on FDI restrictions may be more likely to translate into policy changes in a
democratic country like the United States than in an autocratic country like China. That said,
although Chinese leaders do not have to respond to electoral concerns, research has
suggested that mass opinion in China does influence the policies that the ruling coalition
adopts (Chen Weiss 2013).

31

With those caveats in mind, we believe that our results make an important
contribution to understandings of what influences public opinion on both foreign
investment specifically and IPE more generally. Our results indicate that public attitudes
change based on the policies that other countries adopt towards FDI. As previously
noted, prior scholarship has focused on explaining attitudes towards IPE in economic
and sociological terms, while largely ignoring public attitudes towards other countries’
behavior.107 Our results suggest that there are limits to theories seeking to explain attitudes
towards global economic integration exclusively in terms of domestic consequences or
individual respondents’ characteristics. Our findings also highlight the need for further

inquiry. How much weight do individuals evaluating foreign investments place on
domestic consequences—like the effects on the economy or national security—
compared to concerns like reciprocity? How does the preference for reciprocity translate
into policy? Can policy instruments that try to ensure liberalization—like multilateral and
bilateral treaties—help constrain countries? These are all questions we leave unanswered.
But without answering them, it may be impossible to understand the wave of support for
reversing economic integration that is sweeping the globe.
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TABLES & FIGURES

Table 1: Treatment Options (as presented to US respondents)
Treatment
Options
Ownership
• privately owned
• government owned
Country (*)

• a foreign country
• a country that is a security threat to the United States
• a country that is an economic competitor and security
threat to the United States
• a country that is an economic competitor to the United
States
• a democratic country
• a non-democratic country
• China
• Japan
• Saudi Arabia

National Security (*)

• Low
• high

Firm Size

• small company based in your area
• national Fortune 500 company

Economic Distress

• lower rates of unemployment
• higher rates of unemployment

Reciprocity

• no restrictions on American companies acquiring
corporations
• a number of restrictions on American companies
acquiring corporations
• an absolute prohibition on American companies
acquiring corporations
• signed a treaty that allows American companies to
acquire corporations

* Indicates that this treatment was not presented to respondents in China.
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Figure 1: Primary Experiment Results – US Respondents
Country:
(Baseline = a foreign country)
a country that is a security threat to the United States

●

a country that is an economic competitor and security threat to the United States

●

a country that is an economic competitor to the United States

●

a democratic country

●

a non−democratic country

●

China

●

Japan

●

Saudi Arabia

●

Distress:
(Baseline = lower rates of unemployment than)
higher rates of unemployment than

●

Firmsize:
(Baseline = small company based in your area)
national Fortune 500 company

●

Natsec:
(Baseline = low)
high

●

Owner:
(Baseline = privately owned)
government owned

●

Reciprocity:
(Baseline = no restrictions on American companies acquiring corporations)
a number of restrictions on American companies acquiring corporations

●

an absolute prohibition on American companies acquiring corporations

●

signed a treaty that allows American companies to acquire corporations

●

−.2

0

.2

Change in Pr(US should block acquisition)

Note: Figure 1 plots the average marginal component effect relative to baseline
conditions for each treatment condition. Standard errors clustered at individual level.
Horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2: Primary Experiment Results – Chinese Respondents
Distress:
(Baseline = lower rates of unemployment)
higher rates of unemployment

●

Firmsize:
(Baseline = small company based in your area)
large national company

●

Ownership:
(Baseline = privately owned)
government owned

●

Reciprocity:
(Baseline = no restrictions)
a number of restrictions

●

an absolute prohibition

●

signed a treaty

●

−.2

0

.2

Change in Pr(China should block acquisition)

Note: Figure 2 plots the average marginal component effect relative to baseline
conditions for each treatment condition. Standard errors clustered at individual level.
Horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 3: Secondary Experiment Results – US & Chinese Respondents
U.S. Experiment
5
4
3
2
1
.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

Average Response

.7

.8

.9

1

.7

.8

.9

1

China Experiment
5
4
3
2
1
.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

Average Response

0: Make much easier / 1: Make much harder

Note: Figure 3 plots answers to the reciprocity follow up experiment for US & Chinese
respondents. Subjects told that a country has recently made some change to their policy
(different horizontal lines) for how easy it is for a foreign firm to buy a domestic firm.
What should the response of their own country be? Horizontal lines indicate 95%
confidence intervals.
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First number is past position, second is present position.

Figure 4: Follow-Up Experiment Results – Baseline

0-0
0-3
0-6
3-0
3-3
3-6
6-0
6-3
6-6
.2

.4

.6
Average Response
(0 = Much Easier / 1 = Much Harder)

.8

Note: Figure 4 plots the baseline results of the reciprocity follow-up experiment.
Preferred US position (x-axis) versus other country past and present position (y-axis, 0
(no restrictions) to 10 (complete restrictions)). Horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence
intervals.
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Figure 5: Follow-Up Experiment Results – Negative vs. Positive Reciprocity
3-3 to 0-0 VS 3-3 to 6-6

3-3 to 6-0 VS 3-3 to 0-6

3-3 to 3-0 VS 3-3 to 3-6

3-3 to 6-3 VS 3-3 to 0-3
-.2

0
.2
Difference in Absolute Difference
(- is Negative Reciprocity / + is Positive Reciprocity)

Note: Difference in absolute deviations from baseline position of country at 3-3. Positive
values indicate that the magnitude of change was greater in responding to positive
changes by a country (positive reciprocity larger). Negative values indicate that the
magnitude of change was greater in responding to negative changes by a country
(negative reciprocity larger).
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Supplementary Materials
These Supplementary Materials provide eight pieces of information. Part 1 provides
additional information on the recruitment of subjects for our experiments. Part 2
provides the demographic characteristics of the respondents to whom we fielded our
experiments. Part 3 provides the wording of the primary experiment that we fielded to
respondents in the United States and China. Part 4 provides the wording of the
secondary experiment on the effect of foreign governments changing their policies that
we fielded to respondents in the United States and China. Part 5 provides the wording of
the follow-up experiment on positive and negative reciprocity that we fielded to
respondents recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. Part 6 provides
results tables presenting the results from the figures in the paper. Part 7 provides the
results for the conjoint experiments while just using the first profile that respondents
were asked to evaluate. Part 8 provides the results of our Follow-Up experiment while
breaking out respondents based on whether they passed a quiz to test their competence.
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1. SUBJECT RECRUITMENT
Our Primary and Secondary Experiments were fielded online in February 2015 to
subjects recruited by Survey Sampling International (SSI). SSI is a company based in
Shelton, CT that recruits respondents in over 90 countries for survey research conducted
by businesses and researchers. SSI employs opt-in recruitment methods to construct its
panels of potential respondents. SSI then sends survey invitations to respondents based
on the criteria selected by the business or researchers. More information on SSI’s
sampling procedures is available at: https://www.surveysampling.com/site/assets/files/
1069/esomar-28-questions.pdf (last visited January 13, 2017).
SSI has been used to recruit samples for survey research by academics in a number of
fields. For examples of recent political science research using samples recruited by SSI,
see Adida, Davenport, & McClendon (2016); Chilton & Versteeg (2016); Kertzer and
Brutger (2016); Ryan (2016); Sen (2016); Iyengar & Westwood (2015); Berinsky,
Margolis, & Sances (2014); Duch, Przepiorka, & Stevenson (2014); Malhotra, Margalit, &
Mo (2013); Malhotra & Margalit (2010); Kam (2012); Popp & Rudolph (2011); Healy,
Malhotra, & Mo (2010); Barker, Hurwitz, & Nelson (2008).
We engaged SSI to distribute the U.S. version of our experiments to a sample of
respondents in the United States that was nationally representative based on gender, age,
ethnicity, and census region. We also engaged SSI to distribute the Chinese version of
our experiments to a sample of respondents that was stratified to reflect Chinese
populations’ gender, age, and region. SSI specifically recruited 2,010 adults in the United
States and 1,659 adults in China to take our experiments.
Our Follow-Up Experiment was fielded online in June 2015 to subjects recruited
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform (mTurk). mTurk is an online platform
where “requesters” (like academic researchers) can recruit “workers” to complete various
tasks. Researchers interested in fielding surveys through mTurk post on this online
platform a link to their survey, how long it will take, and how much the workers will be
compensated for completing it. More information on mTurk is available at:
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (last visited January 13, 2017).
mTurk has also been used to recruit samples for survey research by academics in a
number of fields, and research suggests that the workers recruited through the platform
perform well compared to respondents recruited through traditional methods (Huff &
Tingely 2015; Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz 2012; Germine et al. 2012; Mason & Suri 2012;
Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis 2010). For examples of recent political science research
using samples recruited by mturk, see Rho & Tomz (2016); Chilton (2015); Hainmueller
& Hopkins (2015); Chaudoin (2014); Hainmueller, Hopkins, & Yamamoto (2014), Tomz
& Tingley (2014); Tomz & Weeks (2013); Arceneaux (2012); Huber, Hill, & Lenz. (2012).
We used mTurk to recruit 838 adults in the United States to complete our follow up
experiment. Summary statistics of the demographic characteristics of our samples
recruited by SSI and through mTurk are provided in the next section.
!
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2.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF OUR SAMPLES

U.S. Sample
Gender
Female
Male

Chinese Sample

mTurk Sample

N

%

N

%

N

%

1,100
905

54.86
45.14

708
919

43.52
56.48

398
440

47.49
52.51

174
373
361
379
349
298
71

8.68
18.60
18.00
18.90
17.41
14.86
3.54

251
399
483
324
142
22
6

15.43
24.52
29.69
19.91
8.73
1.35
0.37

85
369
201
102
61
18
2

10.14
44.03
23.99
12.17
7.28
2.15
0.24

20
342
90
589
679
285

1.00
17.06
4.49
29.38
33.87
14.21

37
97
418
108
835
131

2.28
5.97
25.71
6.64
51.35
8.06

3
92
25
271
345
102

0.36
10.98
2.98
32.34
41.17
12.17

Age
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75+
Education
Less than high school
High school graduate
Vocational Training
Some College
College Degree
Graduate Degree
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3. PRIMARY EXPERIMENT
3.1. U.S. Version
3.1.1. Intro
In the screens that follow we will be asking for your opinion about how the US
government should respond to the actions of different companies. In each we will
describe both the company and what that company is doing. It is important that for each
set of questions you read through all the details, and give a response to each situation.
Please read each situation carefully and give us your honest response. Each of the
situations is hypothetical, but may reflect something that has or could happen.
3.1.2. Description
A foreign company is considering acquiring an American owned company that is based
in the United States. Please carefully read the following description of the foreign
company and the proposed transaction. After you have finished reading, please answer
the questions at the bottom of the page.
3.1.3. Question
Company A is a [Ownership Treatment] company based in [Country Treatment].
Company A is currently attempting to acquire an American company in an industry that
is considered to pose a [National Security Treatment] risk to national security. The
American company is a [Firm Size Treatment]. The American company is in an
industry that is experiencing [Economic Distress Treatment] than the American
economy overall. The country that Company A is based in currently has [Reciprocity
Treatment] in the same industry. In your opinion, should the United States government
prevent the proposed transaction?
• Yes
• No

!
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3.1.4. Treatment Options

!

Treatment
Ownership

Options
• privately owned
• government owned

Country

• a foreign country
• a country that is a security threat to the United States
• a country that is an economic competitor and security
threat to the United States
• a country that is an economic competitor to the United
States
• a democratic country
• a non-democratic country
• China
• Japan
• Saudi Arabia

National Security

• low
• high

Firm Size

• small company based in your area
• national Fortune 500 company

Economic Distress

• lower rates of unemployment
• higher rates of unemployment

Reciprocity

• no restrictions on American companies acquiring
corporations
• a number of restrictions on American companies
acquiring corporations
• an absolute prohibition on American companies
acquiring corporations
• signed a treaty that allows American companies to
acquire corporations
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3.2. Chinese Version
3.2.1. Intro
In the screens that follow we will be asking for your opinion about how the Chinese
government should respond to the actions of different companies. In each we will
describe both the company and what that company is doing.
In the screens that follow we will be asking for your opinion about how the Chinese
government should respond to the actions of different companies. In each we will
describe both the company and what that company is doing.
3.2.2. Description
A foreign company is considering acquiring a Chinese owned company that is based in
China. Please carefully read the following description of the foreign company and the
proposed transaction. After you have finished reading, please answer the questions at the
bottom of the page.
3.2.3. Question
Company A is a [Ownership Treatment] company based in a foreign country. The
Chinese company is a [Firm Size Treatment]. The Chinese company is in an industry
that is experiencing [Economic Distress Treatment] than the Chinese economy
overall. The country that Company A is based in currently has [Reciprocity Treatment]
in the same industry. In your opinion, should the Chinese government prevent the
proposed transaction?
• Yes
• No

!
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3.2.4. Treatment Options

!

Treatment
Ownership

Options
• privately owned
• government owned

Firm Size

• small company based in your area
• national Fortune 500 company

Economic Distress

• lower rates of unemployment
• higher rates of unemployment

Reciprocity

• no restrictions on American companies acquiring
corporations
• a number of restrictions on American companies
acquiring corporations
• an absolute prohibition on American companies
acquiring corporations
• signed a treaty that allows American companies to
acquire corporations
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4. SECONDARY EXPERIMENT: CHANGES IN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS’ POLICIES
4.1. U.S. Version
4.1.1. Question
The US is considering changing its policies on the purchase of US companies by foreign
companies. Another country has [Present Treatment] for US companies to buy
companies in their country. Should the US make it easier or harder for companies from
this country to buy US companies? The US should:
• make it much harder
• make it somewhat harder
• make no change
• make it somewhat easier
• make it much easier
4.1.2. Treatments Options
• recently made it much harder
• recently made it somewhat harder
• made no changes in its process
• recently made it somewhat easier
• recently made it much easier

!
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4.2 Chinese Version
4.2.1. Question
China is considering changing its policies on the purchase of Chinese companies by
foreign companies. Another country has [Treatments] for Chinese companies to buy
companies in their country. Should China make it easier or harder for companies from
this country to buy Chinese companies? The China should:
• make it much harder
• make it somewhat harder
• make no change
• make it somewhat easier
• make it much easier
4.2.2. Treatment Options
• recently made it much harder
• recently made it somewhat harder
• made no changes in its process
• recently made it somewhat easier
• recently made it much easier!

!
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5. FOLLOW-UP EXPERIMENT: POSITIVE & NEGATIVE RECIPROCITY
5.1. Introduction
Next we are going to ask you about what the US should do in its relationship with other
countries. It is important to pay attention to the description of each country prior to
making your decision. We will describe each country’s policies about how hard or easy it
is for US companies to purchase companies in that country. To simplify things, we will
use a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is no restrictions and 10 is an absolute bans on foreign
ownership. As context, the US is currently a 3 on this scale.
[Note that prior to beginning this task, subjects were asked comprehension questions to
ensure they understood what the numeric scores meant.]
5.2. Question
First consider Country A. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is no restrictions and 10 is an
absolute ban on foreign ownership, in the past Country A has had a score of [Past
Treatment [0-10]] for the ability of US companies to buy companies in Country A.
Today this country is now a [Present Treatment [0-10]]. As context, the US is currently
a 3 on this scale. Should the US make it easier or harder for companies from this country
to buy US companies? The US should:
• make it much harder
• make it somewhat harder
• make no change
• make it somewhat easier
• make it much easier
5.3. Treatment Options
Past Treatments
•0
•3
•6
Present Treatments
•0
•3
•6

!
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6. RESULTS TABLES

Figure 1: U.S. Conjoint Experimental Results
Treatment
Options
Estimate
Ownership
Government Owned
0.013
Security Threat
0.113
Econ. Comp. & Sec. Threat
0.149
Economic Competitor
0.040
Democratic Country
-0.078
Country
Non-democratic Country
0.036
China
0.058
Japan
-0.039
Saudi Arabia
0.045
National Security
High Risk
0.174
Firm Size
A National Fortune 500 Company
0.011
Economic Distress
Higher Rates of Unemployment
-0.015
A Number of Restrictions
0.107
Reciprocity
An Absolute Prohibition
0.162
Signed a Treaty
-0.013

Std. Err.
0.009
0.020***
0.019***
0.020*
0.020***
0.020
0.020**
0.020
0.020*
0.010***
0.009
0.009
0.013***
0.013***
0.013

Figure 2: China Conjoint Experimental Results
Treatment
Options
Estimate
Ownership
Government Owned
0.004
Firm Size
A National Fortune 500 Company
0.112
Economic Distress
Higher Rates of Unemployment
-0.066
A Number of Restrictions
0.078
Reciprocity
An Absolute Prohibition
0.190
Signed a Treaty
-0.051

Std. Err.
0.011
0.012***
0.011***
0.015***
0.017***
0.015***
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Figure 3: U.S. Respondents
Treatment
Mean
Made Much Harder
0.767
Made Somewhat Harder
0.741
No Change
0.654
Made Somewhat Easier
0.598
Made Much Easier
0.596

Std. Err.
0.008
0.008
0.009
0.009
0.010

Figure 3: Chinese Respondents
Treatment
Mean
Made Much Harder
0.689
Made Somewhat Harder
0.656
No Change
0.561
Made Somewhat Easier
0.496
Made Much Easier
0.476

Std. Err.
0.006
0.006
0.005
0.006
0.007

Figure 4: Reciprocity Follow Up Experiment
Past
Present
Mean
Std. Err.
0
0
0.450
0.013
0
3
0.521
0.009
0
6
0.661
0.013
3
0
0.417
0.013
3
3
0.493
0.007
3
6
0.641
0.011
6
0
0.395
0.013
6
3
0.496
0.010
6
6
0.579
0.011

Figure 5: Positive or Negative Reciprocity?
Positive Change
Negative Change
Mean
3-3 to 0-0
3-3 to 6-6
-0.042
3-3 to 6-0
3-3 to 0-6
-0.070
3-3 to 3-0
3-3 to 3-6
-0.071
3-3 to 6-3
3-3 to 0-3
-0.004
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Std. Err.
0.023
0.024
0.023
0.021

7. CONJOINT RESULTS WHILE ONLY USING FIRST EVALUATIONS
For our conjoint experiments, the respondents were asked to evaluate five vignettes. The
figures below recreate figures 1 and 2 while only using the first evaluations from each
respondent.
Figure 1: First Evaluations Only
Country:
(Baseline = a foreign country)
a country that is a security threat to the United States

●

a country that is an economic competitor and security threat to the United States

●

a country that is an economic competitor to the United States

●

a democratic country

●

a non−democratic country

●

China

●

Japan

●

Saudi Arabia

●

Distress:
(Baseline = lower rates of unemployment than)
higher rates of unemployment than

●

Firmsize:
(Baseline = small company based in your area)
national Fortune 500 company

●

Natsec:
(Baseline = low)
high

●

Owner:
(Baseline = privately owned)
government owned

●

Reciprocity:
(Baseline = no restrictions on American companies acquiring corporations)
a number of restrictions on American companies acquiring corporations

●

an absolute prohibition on American companies acquiring corporations

●

signed a treaty that allows American companies to acquire corporations

●

−.2

0

.2

Change in Pr(US should block acquisition)

•

Figure 2: First Evaluations Only

Distress:
(Baseline = lower rates of unemployment)
higher rates of unemployment

●

Firmsize:
(Baseline = small company based in your area)
large national company

●

Ownership:
(Baseline = privately owned)
government owned

●

Reciprocity:
(Baseline = no restrictions)
a number of restrictions

●

an absolute prohibition

●

signed a treaty

●

−.2

−.1

0

.1

Change in Pr(China should block acquisition)
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.2

8. PASSED QUIZ FOR THE FOLLOW-UP EXPERIMENT
To alleviate the concern that this vignette may confuse respondents, we administered a
comprehension quiz about the meaning of the scores to the respondents before they
completed the experiment. Eighty-five percent answered correctly. We then provided an
additional explanation anyone that answered incorrectly. The Figure recreates Figure 4 from
the paper while breaking out for the respondents that did and did not answer the quiz
correctly.
Figure 4: Responses Broken Out by if Respondent Passed Quiz

0-0
0-3
0-6
3-0
3-3
3-6
6-0
6-3
6-6
.2

!

Did Not Pass Quiz
First number is past position, second is present position.

First number is past position, second is present position.

Passed Quiz

.4
.6
.8
Average Response
(0 = Much Easier / 1 = Much Harder)

0-0
0-3
0-6
3-0
3-3
3-6
6-0
6-3
6-6
.2
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.4
.6
.8
Average Response
(0 = Much Easier / 1 = Much Harder)
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